ought
ridicule on successive National Assemblies. In order to moderate the
zeal for the manufacture of decrees, which had often exceeded one
hundred a month, a second or revising chamber was now to be formed on
the basis of age; for it had been found that the younger the deputies
the faster came forth the fluttering flocks of decrees, that often
came home to roost in the guise of curses. A senatorial guillotine, it
was now proposed, should thin out the fledglings before they flew
abroad at all. Of the seven hundred and fifty deputies of France, the
two hundred and fifty oldest men were to form the Council of Ancients,
having powers to amend or reject the proposals emanating from the
Council of Five Hundred. In this Council were the younger deputies,
and with them rested the sole initiation of laws. Thus the young
deputies were to make the laws, but the older deputies were to amend
or reject them; and this nice adjustment of the characteristics of
youth and age, a due blending of enthusiasm with caution, promised to
invigorate the body politic and yet guard its vital interests.
Lastly, in order that the two Councils should continuously represent
the feelings of France, one third of their members must retire for
re-election every year, a device which promised to prevent any violent
change in their composition, such as might occur if, at the end of
their three years' membership, all were called upon to resign at once.

But the real crux of constitution builders had hitherto been in the
relations of the Legislature to the Executive. How should the brain of
the body politic, that is, the Legislature, be connected with the
hand, that is, the Executive? Obviously, so argued all French
political thinkers, the two functions were distinct and must be kept
separate. The results of this theory of the separation of powers were
clearly traceable in the course of the Revolution. When the hand had
been left almost powerless, as in 1791-2, owing to democratic jealousy
of the royal Ministry, the result had been anarchy. The supreme needs
of the State in the agonies of 1793 had rendered the hand omnipotent:
the Convention, that is, the brain, was for some time powerless before
its own instrument, the two secret committees. Experience now showed
that the brain must exercise a general control over the hand, without
unduly hampering its actions. Evidently, then, the deputies of France
must intrust the details of administration to responsible