rmistice with the
conqueror.[135] Five days only were allowed in which Prussia might
decide to follow his example or proceed with the war alone. She
accepted the inevitable on the following day.

The international situation was now strangely like that which followed
immediately upon the battle of Austerlitz. Then it was Prussia, now it
was Austria, that played the part of the cautious friend at the very
time when the beaten allies were meditating surrender. For some time
past the Court of Vienna had been offering its services for mediation:
they were well received at London, with open disappointment by
Prussia, and with ill-concealed annoyance by Napoleon. As at the time
when Haugwitz came to him to dictate Prussia's terms, so now the
Emperor kept the Austrian envoy waiting without an answer, until the
blow of Friedland was dealt.[136] Even then Austria seemed about to
enter the lists, when news arrived of the conclusion of the armistice
at Tilsit. This enabled her to sheathe her sword with no loss of
honour; but, as was the case with Prussia at the close of 1805, her
conduct was seen to be timid and time-serving; and it merited the
secret rebuke of Canning that she "was (as usual) just ten days too
late in her determination, or the world might have been saved."[137]

Whether Austria had been beguiled by the recent diplomatic caresses of
Napoleon may well be doubted; for they were obviously aimed at keeping
her quiet until he had settled scores with Prussia and Russia. His
advances only began on the eve of the last war, and the sharpness of
the transition from threats to endearments could not be smoothed over
even by Talleyrand's finesse.[138] When the slaughter at Eylau placed
him in peril, he again bade Talleyrand soothe the Austrian envoy with
assurances that, if his master was anxious to maintain the integrity
of Turkey, France would maintain it; or if he desired to share in an
eventual partition, France would also arrange that to his liking.[139]
But as the prospects for the campaign improved, Napoleon's tone
hardened. On March the 14th he states that he has enough men to keep
Austria quiet and to "get rid of the Russians in a month." And now he
looks on an alliance with the Hapsburgs merely as giving a short time
of quiet, whereas an alliance with Russia would be "very
advantageous."[140] He had also felt the value of alliance with
Prussia, as his repeated overtures during the campaign testify; but
when Frederic