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Auguis's edition of the Social Contract, pp. xxiii, xxiv. [241] _Gouvernement de Pologne_, v. 246. [242] Of course no such modification as that proposed by Comte (_Politique Positive_, iv. 421) would come within the scope of the doctrine of the Social Contract. For each of the seventeen Intendances into which Comte divides France, is to be ruled by a chief, "always appointed and removed by the central power." There is no room for the sovereignty of the people here, even in things parochial. [243] There was one extraordinary instance during the revolution of attempting to make popular government direct on Rousseau's principle, in the scheme (1790) of which Danton was a chief supporter, for reorganising the municipal administration of Paris. The assemblies of sections were to sit permanently; their vote was to be taken on current questions; and action was to follow the aggregate of their degrees. See Von Sybel's _Hist. Fr. Rev._ i. 275; M. Louis Blanc's _History_, Bk. III. ch. ii. [244] This was also Bodin's definition of an aristocratic state; "si minor pars civium caeteris imperat." [245] _Politics_, III. vi.-vii. [246] _Esprit des Lois_, II. i. ii. [247] Rousseau gave the name of _tyrant_ to a usurper of royal authority in a kingdom, and _despot_ to a usurper of the sovereign authority (_i.e._ [Greek: tyrannos] in the Greek sense). The former might govern according to the laws, but the latter placed himself above the laws (_Cont. Soc._, III. x.) This corresponded to Locke's distinction: "As usurpation is the exercise of power which another hath a right to, so tyranny is the exercise of a power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to." _Civil Gov._, ch. xviii. [248] III. iv. [249] III. vi. [250] III. v. [251] _Cont. Soc._, IV. viii. [252] _Cont. Soc._, IV. viii. 197-201. [253] This is not unlike what Tocqueville says somewhere, that Christianity bids you render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, but seems to discourage any inquiry whether Caesar is an usurper or a lawful ruler. [254] _Cont. Soc._, IV. viii. 203. As we have already seen, he had entreated Voltaire, of all men in the world, to draw up a civil profession of faith. See vol. i. 326. In the New Heloisa (V. v. 117, _n._) Rousseau expresses his opinion that "no true believer could be intolerant or a persecutor. _If I were a magistrate, and if the law pronounced the penalty of death against atheists, I would beg
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