o establish in the character of the future man.
The first is a resolute and unflinching respect for Truth; for the
conclusions, that is to say, of the scientific reason, comprehending
also a constant anxiety to take all possible pains that such
conclusions shall be rightly drawn. Connected with this is the
discipline of the whole range of intellectual faculties, from the
simple habit of correct observation, down to the highly complex habit
of weighing and testing the value of evidence. This very important
branch of early discipline, Rousseau for reasons of his own which we
have already often referred to, cared little about, and he throws very
little light upon it, beyond one or two extremely sensible precepts of
the negative kind, warning us against beginning too soon and forcing
an apparent progress too rapidly. The second fundamental state in a
rightly formed character is a deep feeling for things of the spirit
which are unknown and incommensurable; a sense of awe, mystery,
sublimity, and the fateful bounds of life at its beginning and its
end. Here is the Religious side, and what Rousseau has to say of this
we shall presently see. It is enough now to remark that Emilius was
never to hear the name of a God or supreme being until his reason was
fairly ripened. The third state, which is at least as difficult to
bring to healthy perfection as either of the other two, is a passion
for Justice.

The little use which Rousseau made of this momentous and
much-embracing word, which names the highest peak of social virtue, is
a very striking circumstance. The reason would seem to be that his
sense of the relations of men with one another was not virile enough
to comprehend the deep austerer lines which mark the brow of the
benignant divinity of Justice. In the one place in his writings where
he speaks of justice freely, he shows a narrowness of idea, which was
perhaps as much due to intellectual confusion as to lack of moral
robustness. He says excellently that "love of the human race is
nothing else in us but love of justice," and that "of all the virtues,
justice is that which contributes most to the common good of men."
While enjoining the discipline of pity as one of the noblest of
sentiments, he warns us against letting it degenerate into weakness,
and insists that we should only surrender ourselves to it when it
accords with justice.[308] But that is all. What constitutes justice,
what is its standard, what its source, w