cities in Asia Minor that had gone over to
Rome; but Scipio demanded the whole costs of the war and the surrender
of all Asia Minor. The former terms, he declared, might have been
accepted, had the army still been before Lysimachia, or even on the
European side of the Hellespont; but they did not suffice now, when
the steed felt the bit and knew its rider. The attempts of the great-
king to purchase peace from his antagonist after the Oriental manner
by sums of money--he offered the half of his year's revenues!--failed
as they deserved; the proud burgess, in return for the gratuitous
restoration of his son who had fallen a captive, rewarded the great-
king with the friendly advice to make peace on any terms. This was
not in reality necessary: had the king possessed the resolution to
prolong the war and to draw the enemy after him by retreating into the
interior, a favourable issue was still by no means impossible. But
Antiochus, irritated by the presumably intentional arrogance of his
antagonist, and too indolent for any persevering and consistent
warfare, hastened with the utmost eagerness to expose his unwieldy,
but unequal, and undisciplined mass of an army to the shock of the
Roman legions.

Battle of Magnesia

In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia at the foot of Mount
Sipylus not far from Smyrna, the Roman troops fell in with the enemy
late in the autumn of 564. The force of Antiochus numbered close on
80,000 men, of whom 12,000 were cavalry; the Romans--who had along
with them about 5000 Achaeans, Pergamenes, and Macedonian volunteers
--had not nearly half that number, but they were so sure of victory,
that they did not even wait for the recovery of their general who had
remained behind sick at Elaea; Gnaeus Domitius took the command in his
stead. Antiochus, in order to be able even to place his immense mass
of troops, formed two divisions. In the first were placed the mass of
the light troops, the peltasts, bowmen, slingers, the mounted archers
of Mysians, Dahae, and Elymaeans, the Arabs on their dromedaries, and
the scythe-chariots. In the second division the heavy cavalry (the
Cataphractae, a sort of cuirassiers) were stationed on the flanks;
next to these, in the intermediate division, the Gallic and
Cappadocian infantry; and in the very centre the phalanx armed after
the Macedonian fashion, 16,000 strong, the flower of the army, which,
however, had not room in the narrow space and had to be dr