possibly find belief in the senate. But they probably discerned
only the immediate object of Hamilcar's plans, viz. to procure
compensation in Spain for the tribute and the traffic of the islands
which Carthage had lost; and they deemed an aggressive war on the part
of the Carthaginians, and in particular an invasion of Italy from
Spain--as is evident both from express statements to that effect and
from the whole state of the case--as absolutely impossible. Many, of
course, among the peace party in Carthage saw further; but, whatever
they might think, they could hardly be much inclined to enlighten
their Roman friends as to the impending storm, which the Carthaginian
authorities had long been unable to prevent, for that step would
accelerate, instead of averting, the crisis; and even if they did so,
such denunciations proceeding from partisans would justly be received
with great caution at Rome. By degrees, certainly, the inconceivably
rapid and mighty extension of the Carthaginian power in Spain could
not but excite the observation and awaken the apprehensions of the
Romans. In fact, in the course of the later years before the outbreak
of war, they did attempt to set bounds to it. About the year 528,
mindful of their new-born Hellenism, they concluded an alliance
with the two Greek or semi-Greek towns on the east coast of Spain,
Zacynthus or Saguntum (Murviedro, not far from Valencia), and Emporiae
(Ampurias); and when they acquainted the Carthaginian general
Hasdrubal that they had done so, they at the same time warned him
not to push his conquests over the Ebro, with which he promised
compliance. This was not done by any means to prevent an invasion
of Italy by the land-route--no treaty could fetter the general who
undertook such an enterprise--but partly to set a limit to the
material power of the Spanish Carthaginians which began to be
dangerous, partly to secure the free communities between the Ebro
and the Pyrenees whom Rome thus took under her protection, a basis
of operations in case of its being necessary to land and make war in
Spain. In reference to the impending war with Carthage, which the
senate did not fail to see was inevitable, they hardly apprehended any
greater inconvenience from the events that had occurred in Spain than
that they might be compelled to send some legions thither, and that
the enemy would be somewhat better provided with money and soldiers
than, without Spain, he would have bee
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