h, had formed a
plan of passing over to the enemy, it is affirmed that Hannibal
himself too sometimes entertained thoughts of flying into Gaul, so
that, having left all his infantry, he might hurry away with his
cavalry. Such being the plans in agitation, and such the state of
feeling in the camp, he resolved to depart thence into the regions of
Apulia, which were warmer, and therefore earlier in the harvest.
Thinking also, that the farther he retired from the enemy, the more
difficult would desertion be to the wavering. He set out by night,
having, as before, kindled fires, and leaving a few tents to produce
an appearance; that a fear of an ambuscade, similar to the former,
might keep the Romans in their places. But when intelligence was
brought by the same Lucanian Statilius, who had reconnoitred every
place on the other side the mountains, and beyond the camp, that the
enemy was seen marching at a distance, then plans began to be
deliberated on about pursuing him. The consuls persisted in the same
opinions they ever entertained; but nearly all acquiesced with Varro,
and none with Paulus except Servilius, the consul of the former year.
In compliance with the opinion of the majority, they set out, under
the impulse of destiny, to render Cannae celebrated by a Roman
disaster. Hannibal had pitched his camp near that village, with his
back to the wind Vulturnus, which, in those plains which are parched
with drought, carries with it clouds of dust. This circumstance was
not only very advantageous to the camp, but would be a great
protection to them when they formed their line; as they, with the wind
blowing only on their backs, would combat with an enemy blinded with
the thickly blown dust.
44. When the consuls, employing sufficient diligence in exploring the
road in pursuit of the Carthaginian, had arrived at Cannae, where they
had the enemy in the sight of them, having divided their forces, they
fortify two camps with nearly the same interval as before, at
Geronium. The river Aufidus, which flowed by both the camps, afforded
approach to the watering parties of each, as opportunity served,
though not without contest. The Romans in the lesser camp, however,
which was on the other side the Aufidus, were more freely furnished
with water, because the further bank had no guard of the enemy.
Hannibal, entertaining a hope that the consuls would not decline a
battle in this tract, which was naturally adapted to a cavalry
engag
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