t object.

"If the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
acting in the light of the entire charge of the Court, that the
defendants now on trial, or some of them, conspired together, or
together and with others who were to the Grand Jury unknown, to
kill and murder Patrick Henry Cronin, and that one or more of the
conspirators, in pursuance and furtherance of the conspiracy, did
kill and murder the said Cronin in manner and form as charged in
the indictment, then any or all of the defendants (if any) who so
conspired are in law guilty of such murder, although they may not
have actually killed the said Cronin, or been present at the time
or place of the killing.

"The burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of
the charge against the defendants, and each of them, lies on the
prosecution, and even if it were conceded that somebody murdered
Dr. Cronin, yet the defendants are not required nor expected to
prove who committed the murder.

"The prosecution is required to prove beyond all reasonable doubt
that the defendants, and not somebody else, committed the crime
charged in the indictment. It is insufficient to justify you in
convicting the defendants, that the evidence disclosed that Patrick
H. Cronin was murdered, and that the defendants, or somebody else,
murdered him, or that the probabilities are that the defendants and
not somebody else murdered him.

"You ought not, and can not legally convict the defendants, or
either of them, upon the mere doctrine of chance and probability.
Although you may believe that it is highly probable and very likely
that the defendants are guilty, and even that it is far more likely
and probable that they are guilty than that they are innocent, yet,
no amount of suspicion will warrant you in finding a verdict of
'guilty' against the defendants, or any of them.

"To warrant a conviction upon a charge of murder, the evidence must
be of such kind and quantity as to convince the jury of the truth
of the charge beyond every reasonable doubt, and to a moral
certainty. If, therefore, when you, without passion, prejudice, or
bias, have fairly and honestly considered the entire evidence on
both sides of the case, do not feel morally certain, to the
exclusion of every reas