udalism and the
might of a modern industrial nation--with all the wealth and organizing
power of industry and science at the disposal {304} of a monarchy based
on 'divine right,' and a military aristocracy which moulded and
mastered the nation through control of school and press and army--was a
constant danger to its neighbours. Germany's aims were more aggressive
than those of the western democracies, and its methods were more
efficient than those of other European states of no higher ideals.
True, the democratic and anti-militarist forces were gaining ground in
Germany itself, while elsewhere the folly and waste of militarism were
rousing unprecedented efforts towards peace. But no way out was found.
It was clearly impossible for one state to disarm while its neighbours
armed to the teeth. A few fitful efforts, in which Great Britain took
an honourable part, to bring about a concerted halt came to nothing.
The world appeared convinced that the only statesmanlike way to avert
war was for each state or group of states to make itself stronger than
every other state or group. The war of armaments went on unchecked.
Europe slept on a powder-mine.

In every Dominion the new sense of peril stirred instant response. If
Britain's rivals had counted on the Dominions holding aloof in the hour
of her need, or had held their {305} resources negligible, they were
speedily awakened. In Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa, and
in Canada, press and parliament voiced the new realization of danger
and the new determination to face it more effectively.

At first the prospect in Canada of speedy and harmonious action was of
the brightest. Mr Foster gave notice in the House of Commons of a
resolution in favour of Canadian naval preparations, and the leaders of
both parties met in private conference and agreed upon the general
course to be followed. Late in March 1909 Mr Foster moved his
resolution and supported it with powerful and kindling eloquence. He
dwelt on the burden which Britain bore alone and the urgent need that
Canada should take a more adequate part in naval defence. He opposed
strongly the policy of a fixed annual contribution. The certainty of
constant friction over the amount, the smack of tribute, the radical
defect that it meant hiring somebody else to do what Canadians
themselves ought to do, the failure of such a plan to strike any roots,
were fatal objections. A Canadian Naval Service was the only p