mmitted to her
{314} own navy--'His Majesty's Royal Australian Navy'; New Zealand
announced her dissatisfaction with the original contribution policy;
General Botha declared that South Africa would prefer 'a navy of our
own.' Not contribution therefore, but local navies, afforded the only
basis of uniformity throughout the Empire. Given this attitude on the
part of all the Dominions, there was little question that forms would
soon follow facts, and each of the Five Nations be given its due place
and weight in settling common issues of policy.

On the more technical issues there was equally wide divergence. A
Canadian navy was attacked by some as useless even in the long run.
Canada could not build up an adequate naval administration in half a
century. Inefficiency and jobbery would mark the navy's management.
The sea was one and the navy should be one; concentration at the
supreme danger point, defence by attack, were the latest maxims of
naval strategy. On the other hand, it was urged that what Australia
had done Canada could do, and that the German navy itself had been
built up in twenty years. The sea was one, but it was tens of
thousands of miles in width; {315} the trade routes required
protection, and the coasts must be guarded against sudden raids.

Greater stress, however, was laid on the 'short-run' arguments. That
there was only one possible enemy, Germany; that war with her in a few
years was inevitable; that when it came Great Britain's fleet would be
overmatched, or perilously equalled, were the insistent contentions of
one party. That the Pacific required watching as well as the North
Sea; that relations with Germany, on Sir Edward Grey's testimony, were
improving and war unlikely; that if war came in a few years the naval
power of Britain, to say nothing of that of France and Russia, would be
overwhelming, was the other party's oft-reiterated answer. It was
urged, also, that the Canadian Government's belief in the seriousness
of the emergency must be judged by its acts, not its words. Had it
believed war imminent and the naval situation so dangerous that its
three Dreadnoughts were required, it would unquestionably have been too
patriotic to think for a moment of any other course but to bring on a
general election in 1913 to override the Senate.

That is now ancient history. The outbreak of the Great War threw the
Canadian naval {316} question, along with so many greater questions,
into the