ossible; so as soon as I saw him
stop I went at him head-on with the cavalry and infantry, not even waiting
to deploy more than a Regiment. Price's men would line the road and get
one or two volleys at us and then slip off into the woods before we could
deploy or return their fire. They did not get hurt much, but we did; but
at the same time it broke up his game of holding us back, and we kept
close on to his rear. For two or three days we were looking for Siegel to
get in ahead and check Price, when to our astonishment a report came from
our rear that he had turned his column in on our road some eight miles
behind us, and there was a general howl from the force that had been
pounding away at Price's rear.
Finally we pushed Price back to Fayetteville, Ark., where we landed during
the month of February, and where we were halted by General Halleck's
orders, who stated that he would relieve our front of the enemy by his
movements with the rest of his forces through Southeast Missouri, down the
Mississippi, and up the Tennessee.
While Price was laying at Springfield, in December, he communicated with
the Confederate Government, and changed all his Missouri State force as
far as practicable into Confederate troops. He also complained to the
Government, and to General Polk, who commanded at Columbus, Ky., of the
impossibility of obtaining the co-operation of the Confederate forces west
of the Mississippi River. From the representations of Polk and Price, the
Confederate Government organized all the country west of the Mississippi
River into a department known as the Trans-Mississippi District, and
placed it under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, who assumed command
early in February, 1862. As soon as he assumed command General Van Dorn
prepared to make an aggressive campaign, using all his forces in Arkansas
and those under Price, estimating that they would reach 30,000 troops. His
plan was to move his forces directly from Arkansas northward, west of Iron
Mountain, by way of Salem, while Price moved from Springfield directly
east and joined his column by way of Salem and Rolla, thence the combined
column to move directly on St. Louis, Van Dorn calculating that he could
strike and capture St. Louis before Halleck could concentrate his troops
or obtain any knowledge of his movements that would enable him to defeat
him before reaching St. Louis. Van Dorn expected to make this move in
February, and his plans and the energy
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