ans for us, the psychologist knows only
objects of awareness, objects which have no meaning, but which simply
exist and which are no longer related to a will but are connected with
other objects as causes and effects. Now we deal no longer with the
chairs and tables before us but from a psychological point of view they
become perceptive ideas of chairs and tables, ideas which are not in the
room but in our own minds. While these objects of our will and of our
personality become mere ideas, our will and personality themselves
become, too, a series of phenomena. Our self is now no longer the
purposive will but is that group of sensations and ideas which clusters
about the perception of our organism and its actions; in short, our
self itself becomes an object of awareness.

Our whole inner experience thus becomes a manifold of objects. Our self
and the actions of our self are thus alike for the psychologist mere
phenomena, mere objects which are perceived. Will and emotion, memory
idea and thought--they all are now passing appearances like the sunshine
and rain, the flowers and waves. By this transformation the immediate
will character of real life is given up, but instead of it a system of
objects is gained, that allows description and explanation. If we are to
deal at all with inner life not from a purposive but from a causal point
of view, we are obliged to admit this reconstruction. Without it we
cannot have any science of the mind, without it we can understand the
intentions of our neighbor and appreciate the truth and morality of his
meanings but we cannot causally explain his experiences or determine
which effects are to be expected. It is thus not an arbitrary
substitution but a procedure just as necessary and logically obligatory
as the work of the chemist who substitutes trillions of invisible atoms
for the glass of water which he drinks. The possibility of causal
explanation of the successive facts demands this remolding of the outer
and of the inner world. We have discussed that before and now only have
to draw the consequences.

Thus for the psychologist the mental world is a system of mental
objects. To be an object means of course to be object of some subject
which is aware of it. What else could it mean to exist at all as object
if not that it is given to some possible subject? But the world of
objects is twofold; we have not only the mental objects of the
psychologist but also the physical objects of the