the modern view of physiological
psychology. If that holds true for the connections between idea and
idea, of course it holds true in the same way for the connection between
mental disposition and the corresponding memory. We can understand
causally that a chemical disposition in the nerve fibers brings about a
chemical excitement in those neurons, but how a mental disposition is to
create mental experience we could not understand; and to explain it
casually, we should need again a reference to the underlying
physiological processes. The hypothesis of mental dispositions would
thus be an entirely superfluous addition by which we transcend the real
experience without gaining anything for the explanation.
Secondly, if we really needed a mental disposition for each memory
picture, in addition to the physiological disposition of the brain
cells, can we overlook that exactly the same thing would then be
necessary for every perception also? The outer impression produces,
perhaps through eye or ear or skin, an excitement of the brain cell and
this excitement is accompanied by a sensation; and no one fancies that
the appearance of this sensation is dependent upon a special disposition
for it on the mental side. No one fancies it, because it is evident that
such a hypothesis again would be entirely useless. If every new
perception needed such a special mental disposition, we should have to
presuppose dispositions for everything which possibly can come into our
surroundings. Every smell, every word, every face which comes anew to us
would need its special ready-made disposition. In other words, our mind
would contain the disposition for every possible idea and that would
mean that these dispositions would be in no way helps for explanation.
If the disposition exists for everything, no one particular thing can be
explained by the existence of that disposition. Again we should have to
rely entirely upon the physiological brain excitement for explaining
that this word or that word is perceived by our mind. But if the brain
excitement alone is sufficient to explain the new perception in the
mind, then no reason can be found why the renewed brain excitement would
not be sufficient to renew the mental experience. Thus there is nowhere
room for mental dispositions below the level of consciousness.
Thirdly, what could we really mean by such mental dispositions? A
physiological disposition for a physiological action is certainly not
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