heed of that), and that
which is our beginning, regeneration, and happiest end, likeness to God,
which in one word we call godliness;... other things follow as the shadow
does the substance." In the same pamphlet this envious hater of greatness
remarks that "to govern a nation piously and justly, which only is to say
happily, is for a spirit of the greatest size, and divinest mettle." And
men worthy of this description had, as it seemed to him, arisen in his
own time. His praise of Cromwell and the leaders associated with him is
almost extravagant in its enthusiasm. "While you, O Cromwell, are left
among us, he hardly shows a proper confidence in the Supreme, who
distrusts the security of England, when he sees that you are in so
special a manner the favoured object of the Divine regard." His mind is
full of the achievements of Cyrus, Epaminondas, and Scipio; he denies to
the Protector no honour that may be drawn from these high comparisons.
And then, as in _Lycidas_, so also in _The Second Defence of the People
of England_, Milton concludes his celebration of another by a return to
himself and his pride in a duty fulfilled. Opportunity, he declares, is
offered for great achievements; if it be not seized, posterity will judge
"that men only were wanting for the execution; while they were not
wanting who could rightly counsel, exhort, inspire, and bind an unfading
wreath of praise round the brows of the illustrious actors in so glorious
a scene."
In the measures that he recommends to Cromwell as necessary for the
public welfare, his mistakes are the generous errors of an idealist. He
writes as if all were either Cromwells or Miltons, and worthy of the
fullest measure of liberty. "Now the time seems come," he exclaims,
"wherein Moses, the great prophet, may sit in heaven rejoicing to see
that memorable and glorious wish of his fulfilled, when not only our
seventy elders, but all the Lord's people, are become prophets." His
general propositions on the function of law are unimpeachable. "He who
wisely would restrain the reasonable soul of man within due bounds, must
first himself know perfectly how far the territory and dominion extends
of just and honest liberty. As little must he offer to bind that which
God hath loosened as to loosen that which He hath bound. The ignorance
and mistake of this high point hath heaped up one huge half of all the
misery that hath been since Adam." But with the application to issues of
the d
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