the papers, Gallatin did not and
could not reply. Mr. Gallatin answered that whether the House had a
discretionary power, or whether it was bound by the instrument, there
was no impropriety in calling for the papers. He hoped to have avoided
the constitutional question in the motion, but as the gentlemen had come
forward on that ground, he had no objection to rest the decision of the
constitutional power of Congress on the fate of the present question. He
would therefore state that the House had a right to ask for the papers.

The constitutional question being thus squarely introduced, Mr. Gallatin
made an elaborate speech, which, from its conciseness in statement,
strength of argument, and wealth of citations of authority, was, to say
the least, inferior to no other of those drawn out in this memorable
struggle. In its course he compared the opinion of those who had opposed
the resolution to the saying of an English bishop, that the people had
nothing to do with the law but to obey it, and likened their conduct to
the servile obedience of a Parliament of Paris under the old order of
things. He concluded with the hope that the dangerous doctrine, that the
representatives of the people have not the right to consult their
discretion when about exercising powers delegated by the Constitution,
would receive its death-blow. Griswold replied in what by common consent
was the strongest argument on the Federal side. The call, at first view
simple, had, he said, become a grave matter. The gist of his objection
to it was that the people in their Constitution had made the treaty
power paramount to the legislative, and had deposited that power with
the President and Senate.

Mr. Madison once more rose to the constitutional question. He said that,
if the passages of the Constitution be taken literally, they must clash.
The word _supreme_, as applied to treaties, meant as over the state
Constitutions, and not over the Constitution and laws of the United
States. He supported Mr. Gallatin's view of the congressional power as
cooeperative with the treaty power. A construction which made the treaty
power omnipotent he thought utterly inadmissible in a constitution
marked throughout with limitations and checks.

Mr. Gallatin again claimed the attention of the House, as the original
question of a call for papers had resolved itself into a discussion on
the treaty-making power. In the treaty of peace of 1783 there were
three articles whi