of January, fifty men of the 14th Sikhs marched down
from Mastuj and, on the 1st of February, Mr. Robertson, the British
agent, arrived from Gilgit. He had with him an escort of two
hundred and eighty men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, and thirty-three
Sikhs; and was accompanied by three European officers. When he
arrived he heard that Umra Khan had, at the invitation of Amir,
marched into Chitral; but that his progress had been barred by the
strong fort of Drosh. As the Chitralis hate the Pathans, they were
not inclined to yield to the orders of Amir to surrender the fort,
and were consequently attacked. The place, however, was surrendered
by the treachery of the governor. Amir then advanced, and was
joined by Sher Afzul.
Mr. Robertson wrote to Amir Khan, saying that he must leave the
Chitral territory. Amir paid no attention to the order, and Mr.
Robertson reported this to the government of India. They issued, in
March, 1895, a proclamation warning the Chitralis to abstain from
giving assistance to Amir Khan, and intimating that a force
sufficient to overcome all resistance was being assembled; but that
as soon as it had attained its object, it would be withdrawn.
The Chitralis, who now preferred Sher Afzul to Amir, made common
cause with the former. Mr. Robertson learned that men were already
at work, breaking up the road between Chitral and Mastuj; and
accordingly moved from the house he had occupied to the fort, which
was large enough to receive the force with him.
On the 1st of March, all communications between Mr. Robertson and
Mastuj had ceased; and troops were at once ordered to assemble, to
march to his relief. It was clearly impossible for our agent to
retire as, in order to do so, he would have to negotiate several
terrible passes, where a mere handful of men could destroy a
regiment. Thus it was that the Pioneers had been ordered to break
up their cantonment, and advance with all speed to Gilgit.
Hostilities had already begun. A native officer had started, with
forty men and sixty boxes of ammunition, for Chitral; and had
reached Buni, when he received information that his advance was
likely to be opposed. He accordingly halted and wrote to Lieutenant
Moberley, special duty officer with the Kashmir troops in Mastuj.
The local men reported to Moberley that no hostile attack upon the
troops was at all likely but, as there was a spirit of unrest in
the air, he wrote to Captain Ross, who was with Lieutena
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