each prince
could do what he liked in his own country; they might combine to make
war on an excommunicate king, but only if war suited their secular
policy; and the rivalry between Francis and Charles was so keen, that
each set greater store upon Henry's help than upon his destruction.

Thus the breach with Rome was made a possible, though not an easy,
task; and Henry was left to settle the matter at home with little to
fear from abroad, except threats which he knew to be empty. England
was the key of the situation, and in England must be sought the chief
causes of Henry's success. If we are to believe that Henry's policy
was at variance with the national will, his reign must remain a
political mystery, and we can offer no explanation of the facts that
Henry was permitted to do his work at all, and that it has stood so
long the test of time. He had, no doubt, exceptional facilities for
getting his way. His dictatorship was the child of the Wars of the
Roses, and his people, conscious of the fact that Henry was their only
bulwark against the recurrence of civil strife, and bound up as they
were in commercial and industrial pursuits, were willing to bear with
a much more arbitrary government than they would have been in less
perilous times. The alternatives may have been evil, but the choice
was freely made. No government, whatever its form, whatever its (p. 430)
resources, can permanently resist the national will; every nation
has, roughly speaking, the government it deserves and desires, and a
popular vote would never in Henry's reign have decreed his deposition.
The popular mind may be ill-informed, distorted by passion and
prejudice, and formed on selfish motives. Temporarily, too, the
popular will may be neutralised by skilful management on the part of
the government, by dividing its enemies and counterworking their
plans; and of all those arts Henry was a past master. But such
expedients cannot prevail in the end; in 1553 the Duke of
Northumberland had a subtle intellect and all the machinery of Tudor
government at his disposal; Queen Mary had not a man, nor a shilling.
Yet Mary, by popular favour, prevailed without shedding a drop of
blood. Henry himself was often compelled to yield to his people.
Abject self-abasement on their part and stupendous power of will on
Henry's, together provide no adequate solution for the history of his
reign.

With all his self-will, Henry was never blind to the distinction
bet