n.
That his continuance should be restrained to seven years, was the
opinion of the Convention at an earlier stage of its session, when it
voted that term, by a majority of eight against two, and by a simple
majority, that he should be ineligible a second time. This opinion was
confirmed by the House so late as July 26, referred to the Committee of
detail, reported favorably by them, and changed to the present form by
final vote, on the last day, but one only, of their session. Of this
change, three states expressed their disapprobation; New York, by
recommending an amendment, that the President should not be eligible
a third time, and Virginia and North Carolina, that he should not be
capable of serving more than eight, in any term of sixteen years; and
although this amendment has not been made in form, yet practice seems
to have established it. The example of four Presidents, voluntarily
retiring at the end of their eighth year, and the progress of public
opinion, that the principle is salutary, have given it in practice the
force of precedent and usage; insomuch, that should a President consent
to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he would be rejected, on
this demonstration of ambitious views.

But there was another amendment, of which none of us thought at the
time, and in the omission of which, lurks the germ that is to destroy
this happy combination of National powers, in the general government,
for matters of National concern, and independent powers in the States,
for what concerns the States severally. In England, it was a great point
gained at the Revolution, that the commissions of the Judges, which had
hitherto been during pleasure, should thenceforth be made during good
behavior. A Judiciary, dependant on the will of the King, had proved
itself the most oppressive of all tools in the hands of that magistrate.
Nothing, then, could be more salutary, than a change there, to the
tenure of good behavior; and the question of good behavior, left to the
vote of a simple majority in the two Houses of Parliament. Before
the Revolution, we were all good English Whigs, cordial in their free
principles, and in their jealousies of their Executive magistrate. These
jealousies are very apparent, in all our state Constitutions; and, in
the General government in this instance, we have gone even beyond
the English caution, by requiring a vote of two thirds, in one of the
Houses, for removing a Judge; a vote so impos