the estuary of the Thames. Another fierce fight at Kijkduin on August 21
was still more to the advantage of the Dutch. Meanwhile on land the
French had scored a real success by the capture of the great fortress of
Maestricht with its garrison of 6000 men, after a siege which lasted
from June 6 to July 1. All attempts, however, to pass the water-line and
enter Holland met with failure; and, as the summer drew to its close,
the advance of Imperial and Spanish forces began to render the position
of the French precarious. William seized his opportunity in September to
capture Naarden before Luxemburg could advance to its relief. He then
took a bolder step. In October, at the head of an army of 25,000 men, of
whom 15,000 were Spanish, he marched to Cologne and, after effecting a
junction with the Imperial army, laid siege to Bonn, which surrendered
on November 15. This brilliant stroke had great results. The French,
fearing that their communications might be cut, withdrew from the Dutch
frontier; and at the same time the Muenster-Cologne forces hastily
evacuated the eastern provinces. The stadholder before the end of the
year entirely freed the country from its invaders. Once more a Prince of
Orange had saved the Dutch Republic in its extremity.
The effect of this was to place almost supreme power in his hands. Had
the prince at this moment set his heart upon obtaining the title of
sovereign, he would have had but little difficulty in gratifying his
ambition. Leading statesmen like the Council-Pensionary Fagel, the
experienced Van Beverningh, and Valckenier, the most influential man in
Amsterdam, would have supported him. But William was thoroughly
practical. The freeing of the Provinces from the presence of the enemy
was but the beginning of the task which he had already set before
himself as his life-work, _i.e._ the overthrow of the menacing
predominance of the French power under Louis XIV. His first care was the
restoration of the well-nigh ruined land. The country outside the
water-line had been cruelly devastated by the invaders, and then
impoverished by having for a year and a half to maintain the armies of
occupation. Large tracts on the borders of Holland, Utrecht and
Friesland, submerged by the sea-waters through the cutting of the dams,
had been rendered valueless for some years to come, while those parts of
Holland and Zeeland on which the enemy had not set foot had been crushed
beneath heavy taxes and the loss
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