rking than the European, but they were also better equipped. The
English complained as a grievance that the Americans adopted new and
unwarranted devices in naval warfare; that their vessels were heavier
and better constructed, and their missiles of unusual shape and improper
use. The Americans resorted to expedients that had not been tried
before, and excited a mixture of irritation and respect in the English
service, until "Yankee smartness" became a national misdemeanor.

The English admitted themselves to be slow to change their habits, but
the French were both quick and scientific; yet Americans did on the
ocean what the French, under stronger inducements, failed to do. The
French privateer preyed upon British commerce for twenty years without
seriously injuring it; but no sooner did the American privateer sail
from French ports than the rates of insurance doubled in London, and an
outcry for protection arose among English shippers which the Admiralty
could not calm. The British newspapers were filled with assertions that
the American cruiser was the superior of any vessel of its class, and
threatened to overthrow England's supremacy on the ocean.

Another test of relative intelligence was furnished by the battles at
sea. Instantly after the loss of the Guerriere the English discovered
and complained that American gunnery was superior to their own. They
explained their inferiority by the length of time that had elapsed since
their navy had found on the ocean an enemy to fight. Every vestige of
hostile fleets had been swept away, until, after the battle of
Trafalgar, British frigates ceased practice with their guns. Doubtless
the British navy had become somewhat careless in the absence of a
dangerous enemy, but Englishmen were themselves aware that some other
cause must have affected their losses. Nothing showed that Nelson's
line-of-battle ships, frigates, or sloops were, as a rule, better fought
than the Macedonian and Java, the Avon and Reindeer. Sir Howard Douglas,
the chief authority on the subject, attempted in vain to explain British
reverses by the deterioration of British gunnery. His analysis showed
only that American gunnery was extraordinarily good. Of all vessels, the
sloop-of-war--on account of its smallness, its quick motion, and its
more accurate armament of thirty-two-pound carronades--offered the best
test of relative gunnery, and Sir Howard Douglas in commenting upon the
destruction of the Peacock