in proportion to the European force;
that Europeans cannot undertake cantonment duties, or, speaking
generally, any of the duties which the military may from time to time
be called to render in support of the civil power, during peace; that
in war, again, they are admirable on the battle-field, but that they
cannot turn their victories to account by following up a discomfited
foe, unless they have the aid of native troops, nor perform many other
services which are not less indispensable than great battles to
success against an enemy who knows the ground and is inured to the
climate.

This line of argument very naturally raises the question, wherefore
then is the maintenance of so large a European army necessary?
Rebellion has been crushed, and European troops are not suited for the
repression of such local disturbances as occasionally occur. There is
little present prospect of war from without, though Persia is moving
towards Herat, and apparently preparing for Dost Mohammed's death. The
answer which I invariably receive is this--'You cannot tell what will
happen in India. Heretofore you have held the Sikhs in subjection by
the aid of the Sepoys, and the Sepoys by means of the Sikhs. But see
what is happening now. The Sikh soldiers are quartered all over India.
They are fraternising with the natives of the South--adopting their
customs and even their faith. Half the soldiers in a regiment lately
stationed at Benares were converted to Hindooism before they left that
holy place. Beware, or you will shortly have to cope in India with a
hostile combination more formidable than any of those which you have
encountered before.' If you draw from all this the inference that what
you really dread is your native army, you get into the vicious circle
again.

Do not suppose that I am tempted by these logical paradoxes to run to
hasty conclusions. I am aware that for many reasons we must now
entertain, and probably shall long find it necessary to entertain, a
large army, native and European, in India. Practically, what we have
to do is to endeavour, by a judicious system of recruiting,
organisation, and distribution, to render our army as serviceable and
as little a source of peril as may be. But I do think that they go far
to prove that, notwithstanding our vast physical superiority to
anyt