want of
concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The
whole business of legislation in the American Congress, as well as in
the State Legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway
business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to
be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the
British Parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance our
Reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session, just
as a Railway Bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in
Parliament. There was no Government to deal with. The interests of the
Union, as a whole and distinct from local and sectional interests, had
no organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of
canvassing this member of Congress or the other. It is easy to
perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the
exception but the rule.

Now I feel very strongly, that when a people have been once thoroughly
accustomed to the working of such a Parliamentary system as ours, they
never will consent to revert to this clumsy irresponsible mechanism.
Whether we shall be able to carry on the war here long enough to allow
the practice of Constitutional Government and the habits of mind which
it engenders to take root in these provinces, may be doubtful. But it
may be worth your while to consider whether these views do not throw
some light on affairs in Europe. If you part with constitutional
monarchies there, you may possibly get something much more democratic;
but you cannot, I am confident, get American republicanism. It is the
fashion to say, 'of course not; we cannot get their federal system;'
but this is not the only reason, there are others that lie deeper.
Look at France, where they are trying to jumble up the two things, a
head of the State responsible to the people who elect him, and a
ministry responsible to the Parliament.

* * * * *

_To the Duke of Newcastle._

March 26, 1853.

It is argued that, by the severance of the connection, British
statesmen would be relieved of an onerous responsibility for colonial
acts of which they cannot otherwise rid themselves. Is there not,
however, some fallacy in this? If by conceding absolute independence
the British Parliament can acquit itse