cquisitions, without resistance. I exposed the weakness of
that narrow, that short-sighted policy, which looked no farther than to
our own immediate borders, and imagined that whatsoever lay out of those
bounds was foreign to our interests, and unworthy of our care. The force
of my remonstrances roused the Athenians to a more vigilant conduct. Then
it was that the orators whom Philip had corrupted loudly inveighed
against me, as alarming the people with imaginary dangers, and drawing
them into quarrels in which they had really no concern. This language,
and the fair professions of Philip, who was perfectly skilled in the
royal art of dissembling, were often so prevalent, that many favourable
opportunities of defeating his designs were unhappily lost. Yet
sometimes, by the spirit with which I animated the Athenians and other
neighbouring states, I stopped the progress of his arms, and opposed to
him such obstacles as cost him much time and much labour to remove. You
yourself, Phocion, at the head of fleets and armies sent against him by
decrees which I had proposed, vanquished his troops in Eubaea, and saved
from him Byzantium, with other cities of our allies on the coasts of the
Hellespont, from which you drove him with shame.
_Phocion_.--The proper use of those advantages was to secure a peace to
Athens, which they inclined him to keep. His ambition was checked, but
his forces were not so much diminished as to render it safe to provoke
him to further hostilities.
_Demosthenes_.--His courage and policy were indeed so superior to ours
that, notwithstanding his defeats, he was soon in a condition to pursue
the great plan of conquest and dominion which he had formed long before,
and from which he never desisted. Thus, through indolence on our side
and activity on his, things were brought to such a crisis that I saw no
hope of delivering all Greece from his yoke, but by confederating against
him the Athenians and the Thebans, which league I effected. Was it not
better to fight for the independence of our country in conjunction with
Thebes than alone? Would a battle lost in Boeotia be so fatal to Athens
as one lost in our own territory and under our own walls?
_Phocion_.--You may remember that when you were eagerly urging this
argument I desired you to consider, not where we should fight, but how we
should be conquerors; for, if we were vanquished, all sorts of evils and
dangers would be instantly at our gates.
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