endence and liberty of my country. But,
before I engaged the Athenians in a war not absolutely necessary, I
thought it proper to consider what the event of a battle would probably
be. That which I feared came to pass: the Macedonians were victorious,
and Athens was ruined.

_Demosthenes_.--Would Athens not have been ruined if no battle had been
fought? Could you, Phocion, think it safety to have our freedom depend
on the moderation of Philip? And what had we else to protect us, if no
confederacy had been formed to resist his ambition?

_Phocion_.--I saw no wisdom in accelerating the downfall of my country by
a rash activity in provoking the resentment of an enemy, whose arms, I
foretold, would in the issue prove superior, not only to ours, but to
those of any confederacy we were able to form. My maxim was, that a
state which cannot make itself stronger than any of its neighbours,
should live in friendship with that power which is the strongest. But
the more apparent it was that our strength was inferior to that of
Macedon, the more you laboured to induce us, by all the vehemence of your
oratory, to take such measures as tended to render Philip our enemy, and
exasperate him more against us than any other nation. This I thought a
rash conduct. It was not by orations that the dangerous war you had
kindled could finally be determined; nor did your triumphs over me in an
assembly of the people intimidate any Macedonian in the field of
Chaeronea, or stop you yourself from flying out of that field.

_Demosthenes_.--My flight from thence, I must own, was ignominious to me;
but it affects not the question we are agitating now, whether the
counsels I gave to the people of Athens, as a statesman and a public
minister, were right or wrong. When first I excited them to make war
against Philip, the victories gained by Chabrias, in which you, Phocion,
had a share (particularly that of Naxos, which completely restored to us
the empire of the sea), had enabled us to maintain, not only our own
liberty, but that of all Greece, in the defence of which we had formerly
acquired so much glory, and which our ancestors thought so important to
the safety and independence of Athens. Philip's power was but beginning,
and supported itself more by craft than force. I saw, and I warned my
countrymen in due time, how impolitic it would be to suffer his
machinations to be carried on with success, and his strength to increase
by continual a