nal debt. The determination of
Congress to make adequate provision for the support of the public credit
was justified in his mind by every consideration. A country like the
United States, possessed of little active wealth, must borrow in
emergencies; to borrow on good terms, it must establish its credit; and
to maintain its credit, it must faithfully observe its contracts. But
over and above these considerations, dictated by expediency, were
"immutable principles of moral obligation." Moreover, the national debt
was no ordinary obligation: it was "the price of liberty." On all sides,
it was agreed that the debt contracted abroad should be provided for in
the precise terms of the contracts.
It was only in regard to the domestic debt that differences of opinion
were likely to arise. The notes representing this debt were of all sorts
and kinds. Much of it had changed hands and all of it had depreciated in
value. Some of it still circulated as a monetary medium. The vital
question was: how were the present holders to be paid? At the face value
of the paper, or at the price for which it had been purchased? Hamilton
argued firmly against any discrimination, both because it was a breach
of contract and because it was a violation of the rights of a fair
buyer.
When this part of Hamilton's plan came before Congress in concrete form,
it gave rise to the bitterest debate which had been heard. That it would
give opportunity for immoderate speculation was plain enough; yet every
alternative which aimed to do justice by both the original and the
present holder was confessedly inadequate, when a certificate of
indebtedness, for example, had passed through several hands without
record.
No sooner was Hamilton's proposal made than a wild scramble began for
the possession of the hitherto worthless government paper. "Couriers and
relay horses by land, and swift sailing pilot boats by sea, were flying
in all directions," wrote Jefferson. "Active partners and agents were
associated and employed in every state, town, and country neighborhood,
and this paper was bought up at 5/ and even as low as 2/ in the pound,
before the holder knew Congress had already provided for its redemption
at par. Immense fortunes were thus filched from the poor and ignorant,
and fortunes accumulated by those who had themselves been poor enough
before."
[Map: Vote on Assumption July 24, 1790]
The second part of the scheme outlined in Hamilton's first repo
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