ophical basis of a belief in God, but also to
set forth the various conceptions of the divine nature which have been
held by men in all ages and to trace them to their origin: in short, he
permitted and encouraged the lecturers to compose a history of natural
theology or of some part of it. Even when it is thus limited to its
historical aspect the theme is too vast to be mastered completely by any
one man: the most that a single enquirer can do is to take a general but
necessarily superficial survey of the whole and to devote himself
especially to the investigation of some particular branch or aspect of
the subject. This I have done more or less for many years, and
accordingly I think that without being presumptuous I may attempt, in
compliance with Lord Gifford's wishes and directions, to lay before my
hearers a portion of the history of religion to which I have paid
particular attention. That the historical study of religious beliefs,
quite apart from the question of their truth or falsehood, is both
interesting and instructive will hardly be disputed by any intelligent
and thoughtful enquirer. Whether they have been well or ill founded,
these beliefs have deeply influenced the conduct of human affairs; they
have furnished some of the most powerful, persistent, and far-reaching
motives of action; they have transformed nations and altered the face of
the globe. No one who would understand the general history of mankind
can afford to ignore the annals of religion. If he does so, he will
inevitably fall into the most serious misconceptions even in studying
branches of human activity which might seem, on a superficial view, to
be quite unaffected by religious considerations.
[Sidenote: An historical enquiry into the evolution of religion
prejudices neither the question of the ethical value of religious
practice nor the question of the truth or falsehood of religious
belief.]
Therefore to trace theological and in general religious ideas to their
sources and to follow them through all the manifold influences which
they have exerted on the destinies of our race must always be an object
of prime importance to the historian, whatever view he may take of their
speculative truth or ethical value. Clearly we cannot estimate their
ethical value until we have learned the modes in which they have
actually determined human conduct for good or evil: in other words, we
cannot judge of the morality of religious beliefs until we have
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