ardly, I think, be maintained by any one, to
whatever school of thought he may belong; accordingly that method of
treatment need not occupy us further. Far otherwise is it with the
philosophic method which undertakes to enquire into the truth or
falsehood of the belief in a God: no method could be more appropriate at
a time like the present, when the opinions of educated and thoughtful
men on that profound topic are so unsettled, diverse, and conflicting. A
philosophical treatment of the subject might comprise a discussion of
such questions as whether a natural knowledge of God is possible to man,
and, if possible, by what means and through what faculties it is
attainable; what are the grounds for believing in the existence of a
God; and, if this belief is justified, what may be supposed to be his
essential nature and attributes, and what his relations to the world in
general and to man in particular. Now I desire to confess at once that
an adequate discussion of these and kindred questions would far exceed
both my capacity and my knowledge; for he who would do justice to so
arduous an enquiry should not only be endowed with a comprehensive and
penetrating genius, but should possess a wide and accurate acquaintance
with the best accredited results of philosophic speculation and
scientific research. To such qualifications I can lay no claim, and
accordingly I must regard myself as unfitted for a purely philosophic
treatment of natural theology. To speak plainly, the question of the
existence of a God is too deep for me. I dare neither affirm nor deny
it. I can only humbly confess my ignorance. Accordingly, if Lord Gifford
had required of his lecturers either a dogmatic or a philosophical
treatment of natural theology, I could not have undertaken to deliver
the lectures.

[Sidenote: The method followed in these lectures is the historical.]

But in his deed of foundation, as I understand it, Lord Gifford left his
lecturers free to follow the historical rather than the dogmatic or the
philosophical method of treatment. He says: "The lecturers shall be
under no restraint whatever in their treatment of their theme: for
example, they may freely discuss (and it may be well to do so) all
questions about man's conceptions of God or the Infinite, their origin,
nature, and truth." In making this provision the founder appears to have
allowed and indeed encouraged the lecturers not only to discuss, if they
chose to do so, the philos