icion gravely injurious and not easily condoned. There is guilt
in keeping that suspicion to oneself; to give it out in words is
calumny, whether it be true or not, simply because it is unfounded.
In a judgment there is neither doubt nor suspicion; I make my own the
idea presented to my mind. The balance of assent, in which is weighed,
the evidence for and against, is not kept even, nor is it partially
inclined; It goes down with its full weight, and the party under
consideration stands convicted before the tribunal of my judgment. I do
not say, I wonder if he is guilty; nor he most likely is guilty; but:
he is guilty--here is a deliberate judgment. Henceforth my esteem
ceases for such a person. Translated in words such a judgment is not
calumny because it is supposedly founded in reason; but it is
detraction, because it is injurious.
Such a judgment, without any exterior expression, is sinful if it is
rash. And what makes it rash? The insufficiency of motive on which it
is based. And whence comes the knowledge of such sufficiency or
insufficiency of motive? From the intelligence, but mostly from the
conscience. That is why many unintelligent people judge rashly and sin
not, because they know no better. But conscience nearly always supplies
intelligence in such matters and ignorance does not always save us from
guilt. An instinct, the wee voice of God in the soul, tells us to
withhold our judgment even when the intelligence fails to weigh the
motives aright. To contemn this voice is to sin and be guilty of rash
judgment.
In the language of ordinary folks, not always precise and exact in
their terms, an opinion is frequently a judgment, to think this or that
of another is often to judge him accordingly. The suspicions of
suspicious people are at times more than suspicions and are clearly
characterized judgments. To render a verdict on the neighbor's
character is a judgment, by whatever other name it is called; all that
is necessary is to come to a definite conclusion and to give the assent
of the will to that conclusion.
When the conduct of the neighbor is plainly open to interpretation, if
we may not judge immediately against him, neither are we bound to give
him the benefit of the doubt; we may simply suspend all judgment and
await further evidence. In our exterior dealings this suspicion should
not affect our conduct, for every man has a right to be treated as an
honest man and does not forfeit that right on t
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