tive we may have in telling an untruth the power
to change its nature; a lie is a lie, no matter what prompted it.
Whether it serves the purpose of amusement, as a jocose lie; or helps
to gain us an advantage or get us out of trouble, as an officious lie;
or injures another in any way, as a pernicious lie: mendacity is the
character of our utterances, the guilt of willful falsehood is on our
soul. A restriction should, however, be made in favor of the jocose
lie; it ceases to be a lie when the mind of the speaker is open to all
who listen and his narration or statement may be likened to those
fables and myths and fairy tales in which is exemplified the charm of
figurative language. When a person says what is false and is convinced
that all who hear him know it is false, the contradiction between his
mind and its expression is said to be material, and not formal; and in
this the essence of a lie does not consist.
A lie is always a sin; it is what is called an intrinsic evil and is
therefore always wrong. And why is this? Because speech was given us to
express our thoughts; to use this faculty therefore for a contrary
purpose is against its nature, against a law of our being, and this is
evil. The obnoxious consequences of falsehood, as it is patent to all,
constitute an evil for which falsehood is responsible. But deception,
one of those consequences, is not in itself and essentially, a moral
fault. Deception, if not practised by lying and therefore not intended
but simply suffered to occur, and if there be grave reason for
resorting to this means of defense, cannot be put down as a thing
offensive to God or unjustly prejudicial to the neighbor. But when
deception is the effect of mendacity, it assumes a character of malice
that deserves the reprobation of man as it is condemned by God. And
this is another reason why lying is essentially an evil thing, and can
never, under any circumstances be allowed or justified.
This does not mean that lying is always a mortal sin. In fact, it is
oftener venial than mortal. It becomes a serious fault only in the
event of another malice being added to it. Thus, if I lie to one who
has a right to know the truth and for grave reasons; if the mendacious
information I impart is of a nature to mislead one into injury or loss,
and this thing I do maliciously; or if my lying is directly disparaging
to another; in these cases there is grave malice and serious guilt. But
if there is no injus
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