preciated Italy's reasons for not joining
with her allies at the beginning of the war and has conducted
a propaganda discrediting her willingness to remain neutral
provided the Austro-Hungarian concessions proved sufficient
and were sufficiently guaranteed.

THE GERMAN VIEW.

_From the Frankfurter Zeitung of March 3._

Article VII. of the Austro-German-Italian Treaty, the terms of which
have never before been made public, not only provides for the right of
compensation in case one party to the contract enriches itself
territorially in the Balkans, but also forbids either Austria or Italy
to undertake anything in the Balkans without the consent of the
other....

In the Tripoli war, when the energetic Duca degli Abruzzi made his
advance in the Adriatic against Prevesa and wished to force the Porte to
yield through a serious action in the Dardanelles, and when Italy
wished to extend her occupation of the Aegean Islands, which lie as
advance posts before the Dardanelles, she was obliged to forego her
aims, and did loyally forego them, because Austria at that time did not
yet desire a movement on the then still quiescent Balkan Peninsula.
According to the Italian view, Austria, in determining to liquidate her
matured account with Serbia without coming to an agreement in the matter
with Italy, canceled the treaty in an important and essential part,
irrespective of the assurance that she contemplated merely punishment of
Serbia and not the acquisition of territory in the Balkans. The Italian
policy considered itself from that moment free from every obligation,
even if the speech of Premier Salandra in December could not be
interpreted as a formal denunciation of the Dreibund....

We have today good grounds for assuming that much as we must reckon with
the fact that the country is determined to go to war if nothing is
granted to it, just so little would it support a Government bent on
making war because it does not receive anything.

It will be as impossible to solve the Trentino question from the point
of view of abstract right as to solve any other iridescent question in
that way. The Trentino question, which was long a question of national,
historical, and ethnological idealism, has now become a real question of
power. The European war and its developments have placed Italy in a
position to use her power in order to expand. This is not unusual in
history....

But it should be carefully noted th