not easy.

_From the Stampa, April 11._

Not only must Italy have her natural frontiers on the east restored, not
only must she have her legitimate supremacy in the Adriatic assured, not
only must she safeguard her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and
in the eventual partition of the Turkish Empire, but she must also see
assured in the Western Mediterranean a greater guarantee for the safety
of herself and her possessions and wider liberty of action than that of
which she has recently had painful experience. These things must be
guaranteed by an alliance with either Russia or with England....

Before having solved this difficulty any decision in favor of war would
be a leap in the dark, an act of inconceivable political blindness. It
would be, to adopt a rough, but inevitable, term, a veritable betrayal.

_From the Giornale d'Italia of April 12, in criticising the foregoing._

We absolutely fail to understand the motive which induced the
Piedmontese journal to print matter so calculated to confuse public
opinion. Indeed, the care with which our contemporary seeks to embarrass
Italian diplomatic action seems somewhat strange and cannot escape the
blame of all those who think it necessary not to hamper the liberty of
action conceded to the Government almost unanimously by Parliament and
by the people....

It seems almost as though the Piedmontese journal had no thought but to
put insoluble problems to the Government, in the face of public opinion,
so as to try to prejudice its action in advance. The Stampa's program
practically means that to the diplomatic rupture with the Central
Empires would be added another diplomatic rupture with the Triple
Entente, thus insuring the isolation which the Stampa professes to fear
so much.

_From the Corriere della Sera, April 12._

The article in the Stampa, which appears ultra-nationalist, is in
reality purely neutralist. Italian aspirations must be kept within
reasonable bounds. What would happen to Italy if demands were put
forward which the Entente could not entertain? Quite apart from
questions of direct interest and gain, other factors must be taken into
account. There is the danger to Italy in case of the success of her late
allies, which would mean the prostration of France, the annexation of
Belgium to Germany, the arrival of Austria at Saloniki, British naval
hegemony replaced by German, the revival of Turkey, and the consequent
ambition to resume possession o