es not bring happiness, and is an attempt to compensate the
deficiency. There is a certain tendency, not very great as human nature
is constituted, for justice to beget justice in return--for social
virtue on one side to procure it on the other side. This is a certain
encouragement to each man to perform his own part, in hope that the
other party concerned may do the same. Still, the reciprocity
occasionally fails, and with that the benefits to the just agent. It is
necessary to urge strongly upon individuals, to impress upon the young,
the necessity of performing their duty to society; it is equally
implied, and equally indispensable, that society should perform its part
to them. The suppressing of the correlative obligation of the State to
the individual leaves a one-sided doctrine; the motive of the
suppression, doubtless, is that society does not often fail of its
duties to the individual, whereas individuals frequently fail of their
duties to society. This may be the fact generally, but not always. It is
not the fact where there are bad laws and corrupt administration. It is
not the fact where the restraints on liberty are greater than the
exigencies of the State demand. It is not the fact, so long as there is
a single vestige of persecution for opinions. To be thoroughly
veracious, for example, in a society that restrains the discussion and
expression of opinions, is more than such a society is entitled to.

* * * * *

[PLEASURES OF BENEVOLENCE CONDITIONAL.]

The same fallacy occurs in an allied theme,--the joys of Love and
Benevolence. That love and benevolence are productive of great happiness
is beyond question; but then the feeling must be mutual, it must be
reciprocated. One-sided love or benevolence is a _virtue_, which is as
much as to say it is _not_ a pleasure. The delights of benevolence are
the delights of reciprocated benevolence; until reciprocated, in some
form, the benevolent man has, strictly speaking, the sacrifice and
nothing more. There is a great reluctance to encounter this simple naked
truth; to state it in theory, at least, for it is fully admitted in
practice. We fence it off by the assumption that benevolence will always
have its reward somehow; that if the objects of it are ungrateful,
others will make good the defect at last. Now these qualifications are
very pertinent, very suitable to be urged after allowing the plain
truth, that benevolence is intrinsi