f oral debate. It is this practice that
I propose to put upon its trial. The grounds of the practice I take to
be the following:--

1. That each member of a deliberative body shall be provided with a
complete statement of the facts and reasons in favour of a proposed
measure, and also an equally complete account of whatever can be said
against it. And this is a requirement I would concede to the fullest
extent. No decision should be asked upon a question until the reasonings
_pro_ and _con_ are brought fairly within the reach of every one; to
which I would add--in circumstances that give due time for consideration
of the whole case.

2. The second ground is that this ample provision of arguments, for and
against, should be made by oral delivery. Whatever opportunities members
may have previously enjoyed for mastering a question, these are all
discounted when the assembly is called to pronounce its decision. The
proposer of the resolution invariably summarizes, if he is able, all
that is to be said for his proposal; his arguments are enforced and
supplemented by other speakers on his side; while the opposition
endeavours to be equally exhaustive. In short, though one were to come
to the meeting with a mind entirely blank, yet such a one, having
ordinary faculties of judging, would in the end be completely informed,
and prepared for an intelligent vote.

Now, I am fully disposed to acquiesce in this second assumption
likewise, but with a qualification that is of considerable moment, as we
shall see presently.

3. The third and last assumption is as follows:--Not only is the
question in all its bearings supposed to be adequately set forth in the
speeches constituting the debate, but, in point of fact, the mass of the
members, or a very important section or proportion of them, rely upon
this source, make full use of it, and are equipped for their decision by
means of it; so much so, that if it were withdrawn none of the other
methods as at present plied, or as they might be plied, would give the
due preparation for an intelligent vote; whence must ensue a degradation
in the quality of the decisions.

It is this assumption that I am now to challenge, in the greatest
instance of all, as completely belied by the facts. But, indeed, the
case is so notoriously the opposite, that the statement of it will be
unavoidably made up of the stalest commonplaces; and the novelty will
lie wholly in the inference.

The ordinary att