the sentient organism--so admirable a means of
securing rapid, and often refined, adjustments by the organism to the
habitual conditions of its life[52]. But, if so, not only is this state
of matters a _condition_ to progress in the future; it is further, and
equally, a _consequence_ of progress in the past.

[52] See _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 110-111.

However, be this as it may, from all that has gone before does it not
become apparent that pleasure or happiness on the one hand, and pain or
misery on the other, must be present in sentient nature? And so long as
they are both seen to be equally necessary under the process of
evolution by natural selection, we have clearly no more reason to regard
the pleasure than the pain as an object of the supposed design. Rather
must we see in both one and the same condition to progress under the
method of natural causation which is before us; and therefore I cannot
perceive that it makes much difference--so far as the argument for
beneficence is concerned--whether the pleasures of animals outweigh
their pains, or _vice versa_.

Upon the whole, then, it seems to me that such evidence as we have is
against rather than in favour of the inference, that if design be
operative in animate nature it has reference to animal enjoyment or
well-being, as distinguished from animal improvement or evolution. And
if this result should be found distasteful to the religious mind--if it
be felt that there is no desire to save the evidences of design unless
they serve at the same time to testify to the nature of that design as
beneficent,--I must once more observe that the difficulty thus presented
to theism is not a difficulty of modern creation. On the contrary, it
has always constituted the fundamental difficulty with which natural
theologians have had to contend. The external world appears, in this
respect, to be at variance with our moral sense; and when the antagonism
is brought home to the religious mind, it must ever be with a shock of
terrified surprise. It has been newly brought home to us by the
generalizations of Darwin; and therefore, as I said at the beginning,
the religious thought of our generation has been more than ever
staggered by the question--Where is now thy God? But I have endeavoured
to show that the logical standing of the case has not been materially
changed; and when this cry of Reason pierces the heart of Faith, it
remains for Faith to answer now, as she ha