e contentions
of the State were overruled.

In March, 1902, a suit was instituted by the United States in the
Circuit Court of the eighth federal district. The judges who sat upon
the case decided unanimously that the acquisition of the stock of the
Northern Pacific and the Great Northern Railways by the Securities
Company was a combination for the restraint of trade among the States,
and therefore a violation of the Sherman act. A decree was issued by the
court prohibiting the company from acquiring any more of the stock of
these roads and from exercising any control over either of the roads in
question.

[Illustration: Group portrait.]
Copyright by Clinedinst. Washington.
W. Van Devanter. H. H. Lurton. C. E. Hughes. J. R. Lamar.
O. W. Holmes. J. M. Harlan. E. D. White. J. E. McKenna W. R. Day.
Justices of the United States Supreme Court who acted upon the cases of
the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Companies.

The case was carried to the Supreme Court which by a vote of five to
four, affirmed the decree of the lower court. In the majority opinion
the court took the position that the mere acquisition by the Securities
Company of the stock of the two roads was in itself a combination for
the restraint of trade. The power to do things made unlawful by the
Sherman act had been acquired and this in effect violated that act.

Another point was made clear by the court. The defendants had vigorously
denied that the power of Congress over interstate commerce was extended
to the regulation of railway corporations organized under State laws, by
reason of these corporations engaging in interstate commerce. The court
declared that while this was not the intention of the Government, the
Government was acting within its rights when it took steps, not
prohibited under the Constitution, for protecting the freedom of
interstate commerce. Furthermore, it was held that no State corporation
could stand in the way of the enforcement of the national will by
extending its authority into other States. In substance the court denied
the right of any State to endow a corporation of its creation with power
to restrain interstate commerce.

The contention of the defendants, that the Sherman law was intended to
prohibit only those restraints which are unreasonable at common law, was
dismissed on the ground that this question had been passed upon by the
lower court in other cases.

The dissenting opinions were two in numb