er prestige factor to be considered. This is
what might be called the chain-reaction factor: the likelihood that
technological preeminence in the space field will attract top talent
from other parts of the world to the banner of the country which
develops it, and thus constantly nourish and replenish the efforts of
that country. It is a consideration which has not received general
attention, although it has been discussed before some of the world's
leading space scientists.[21]

Here again, as with the military situation, the Soviets are making every
effort to exploit their dexterity in space. They are pursuing the
prestige gambit directly and indirectly. In the first category, for
example, they give top priority to space exhibits in important public
forums--as their duplicate sputniks strategically placed at the world's
fair and the United Nations attest. Premier Khrushchev's delight in
making gifts to foreigners of miniature Soviet pennants similar to that
carried in Lunik II--which hit the Moon--is another instance.[22]

The indirect drive for prestige via space technology is far more
important. It has been described by a congressional committee as
follows:

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union in
the last several years has demonstrated a great skill in
coordinating its progress in missilery, its success in space
missions, and its foreign policy and world image. Shots seem to
have been timed to maximize the effects of visits of Soviet leaders
and to punctuate Soviet statements and positions in international
negotiations. This is not to equate their space activities with
hollow propaganda. Empty claims do not have a positive effect for
long. Nor is there any firm evidence that it has been possible for
political policymakers to call their shots at times inconsistent
with good scientific and technical needs. The conclusion is rather
that the many elements of scientific, technical, military,
political, and psychological policy are all weighed, and tests
which make a full contribution to such a combined strategy are
carried out and supported with appropriate publicity.[23]

There is also evidence that scientific endeavor by the Russians for
prestige purposes is having repercussions on internal policy. Great
emphasis is currently being placed on the demonstrable usefulness of
scientific effort--to the extent that Soviet