ain all the happenings of the
summer and winter of 1916-1917. It was sent to Berlin on April 26th; the
German Government gave the _Sussex_ "pledge" on May 4th, eight days
afterward. In this reply Germany declared that she would now expect Mr.
Wilson to bring pressure upon Great Britain to secure a mitigation or
suspension of the British blockade, and to this Mr. Wilson promptly and
energetically replied that he regarded the German promise as an
unconditional one and that the Government of the United States "cannot
for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by
German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States
upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made
contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights
of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single
not joint; absolute not relative."

This reply gave satisfaction to both the United States and the countries
of the Allies, and Page himself regarded it as a master stroke. "The
more I think of it," he wrote on May 17th, "the better the strategy of
the President appears, in his latest (and last) note to Germany. They
laid a trap for him and he caught them in their own trap. The Germans
had tried to 'put it up' to the President to commit the first unfriendly
act. He now 'puts it up' to them. And this is at last bound to end the
controversy if they sink another ship unlawfully. The French see this
clearly and so do the best English, and it has produced a most
favourable impression. The future? The German angling for peace will
prove futile. They'll have another fit of fury. Whether they will again
become reckless or commit 'mistakes' with their submarines will depend
partly on their fury, partly on their fear to make a breach with the
United States, but mainly on the state of their submarine fleet. How
many have the English caught and destroyed? That's the main question,
after all. The English view may not be fair to them. But nobody here
believes that they will long abstain from the luxury of crime."

It is thus apparent that when the Germans practically demanded, as a
price of their abstention from indiscriminate submarine warfare, that
Mr. Wilson should move against Great Britain in the matter of the
blockade, they realized the futility of any such step, and that what
they really expected to obtain was the presidential mediation for peace.
President Wi