rman lines "under similar conditions of
transport, for example, as regards length of route."[62] As a
non-reciprocal provision this is an act of interference in internal
arrangements which it is difficult to justify, but the practical effect
of this,[63] and of an analogous provision relating to passenger
traffic,[64] will much depend on the interpretation of the phrase,
"similar conditions of transport."[65]
For the time being Germany's transport system will be much more
seriously disordered by the provisions relating to the cession of
rolling-stock. Under paragraph 7 of the Armistice conditions Germany was
called on to surrender 5000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons, "in good
working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings." Under the
Treaty Germany is required to confirm this surrender and to recognize
the title of the Allies to the material.[66] She is further required, in
the case of railway systems in ceded territory, to hand over these
systems complete with their full complement of rolling-stock "in a
normal state of upkeep" as shown in the last inventory before November
11, 1918.[67] That is to say, ceded railway systems are not to bear any
share in the general depletion and deterioration of the German
rolling-stock as a whole.
This is a loss which in course of time can doubtless be made good. But
lack of lubricating oils and the prodigious wear and tear of the war,
not compensated by normal repairs, had already reduced the German
railway system to a low state of efficiency. The further heavy losses
under the Treaty will confirm this state of affairs for some time to
come, and are a substantial aggravation of the difficulties of the coal
problem and of export industry generally.
(iii.) There remain the clauses relating to the river system of Germany.
These are largely unnecessary and are so little related to the supposed
aims of the Allies that their purport is generally unknown. Yet they
constitute an unprecedented interference with a country's domestic
arrangements and are capable of being so operated as to take from
Germany all effective control over her own transport system. In their
present form they are incapable of justification; but some simple
changes might transform them into a reasonable instrument.
Most of the principal rivers of Germany have their source or their
outlet in non-German territory. The Rhine, rising in Switzerland, is now
a frontier river for a part of its course, and f
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