y that perforce the jury could not accept his evidence when it
reached the point of implicating Ammon. All their attempts in this
direction, however, only roused increased sympathy for the witness and
hostility toward their own client, and made the jury the more ready to
believe that Ammon had been the only one in the end to profit by the
transaction.

Briefly, the two points urged by the defence were:

(1) That Ammon was acting only as Miller's counsel, and hence was
immune, and,

(2) That there was no adequate legal evidence that the thirty thousand
five hundred dollars which Ammon had deposited, as shown by the deposit
slip, was the identical money stolen from the victims of the Franklin
syndicate. As bearing upon this they urged that the stolen money had in
fact been deposited by Miller himself, and so had lost the character of
stolen money before it was turned over to the defendant, and that
Miller's story being that of an accomplice required absolute
corroboration in every detail.

The point that Ammon was acting only as a lawyer was quickly disposed of
by Judge Newburger.

"Something has been said by counsel," he remarked in his charge to the
jury, "to the effect that the defendant, as a lawyer, had a perfect
right to advise Miller, but I know of no rule of law that will permit
counsel to advise how a crime can be committed."

As to the identity of the money, the Court charged that it made no
difference which person performed the physical act of placing the cash
in the hands of the receiving teller of the bank, so long as it was
deposited to Ammon's credit.

On the question of what corroboration of Miller's story was necessary,
Judge Ingraham, in the Appellate Division, expressed great doubt as to
whether in the eyes of the law Miller, the thief, could be regarded as
an accomplice of Ammon in receiving the stolen money at all, and stated
that even if he could be so regarded, there was more than abundant
corroboration of his testimony.

Ammon's conviction was affirmed throughout the courts, including the
Court of Appeals, and the defendant himself is now engaged in serving
out his necessarily inadequate sentence--necessarily inadequate, since
under the laws of the State of New York, the receiver of stolen goods,
however great his moral obliquity may be, and however great the amount
stolen, can only receive half the punishment which may be meted out to
the thief himself, "receiving" being punishable by on