will learn
from the proceedings of the executive branch of the government, and of
the two chambers above us, how the disturbances in Rhode Island were
regarded; whether they were looked upon as the establishment of any
government, or as a mere pure, unauthorized, unqualified _insurrection_
against the authority of the existing government of the State.

I say, therefore, that, upon that ground, these facts are not facts
which this court can inquire into, or which the court below could try;
because they are facts going to prove (if they prove any thing) the
establishment of a new sovereignty; and that is a question to be settled
elsewhere and otherwise. From the very nature of the case, it is not a
question to be decided by judicial inquiry. Take, for example, one of
the points which it involves. My adversary offered to prove that the
constitution was adopted by a majority of the people of Rhode Island; by
a large majority, as he alleges. What does this offer call on your
honors to do? Why, to ascertain, by proof, what is the number of
citizens of Rhode Island, and how many attended the meetings at which
the delegates to the convention were elected; and then you have to add
them all up, and prove by testimony the qualifications of every one of
them to be an elector. It is enough to state such a proposition to show
its absurdity. As none such ever was sustained in a court of law, so
none can be or ought to be sustained. Observe that minutes of
proceedings can be no proof, for they were made by no authentic persons;
registers were kept by no warranted officers; chairmen and moderators
were chosen without authority. In short, there are no official records;
there is no testimony in the case but parol. Chief Justice Durfee has
stated this so plainly, that I need not dwell upon it.

But, again, I say you cannot look into the facts attempted to be proved,
because of the certainty of the continuance of the old government till
the new and legal constitution went into effect on the 3d of May, 1843.
To prove that there was another constitution of two days' duration would
be ridiculous. And I say that the decision of Rhode Island herself, by
her legislature, by her executive, by the adjudication of her highest
court of law, on the trial of Dorr, has shut up the whole case. Do you
propose,--I will not put it in that form,--but would it be proper for
this court to reverse that adjudication? That declares that the judges
of Rhode Isla