d, that such exclusive privileges attached to a private
corporation as are inconsistent with the new government may be
abolished. In respect, also, to _public_ corporations which exist only
for public purposes, such as counties, towns, cities, and so forth, the
legislature may, under proper limitations, have a right to change,
modify, enlarge, or restrain them, securing, however, the property for
the uses of those for whom and at whose expense it was originally
purchased. But that the legislature can repeal statutes creating private
corporations, or confirming to them property already acquired under the
faith of previous laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such
corporations exclusively in the State, or dispose of the same to such
purposes as they please, without the consent or default of the
corporators, we are not prepared to admit; and we think ourselves
standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental
laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of the
Constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most
respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine."
This court, then, does not admit the doctrine, that a legislature can
repeal statutes creating private corporations. If it cannot repeal them
altogether, of course it cannot repeal any part of them, or impair them,
or essentially alter them, without the consent of the corporators. If,
therefore, it has been shown that this college is to be regarded as a
private charity, this case is embraced within the very terms of that
decision. A grant of corporate powers and privileges is as much a
contract as a grant of land. What proves all charters of this sort to be
contracts is, that they must be accepted to give them force and effect.
If they are not accepted, they are void. And in the case of an existing
corporation, if a new charter is given it, it may even accept part and
reject the rest. In _Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge_,[53] Lord
Mansfield says: "There is a vast deal of difference between a new
charter granted to a new corporation, (who must take it as it is given,)
and a new charter given to a corporation already in being, and acting
either under a former charter or under prescriptive usage. The latter, a
corporation already existing, are not obliged to accept the new charter
_in toto_, and to receive either all or none of it; they may act partly
under it, and partly under their old charte
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