n man's responsibility for negligence, and the indirect consequences
of his deed. All sin is selfish, and all selfishness ignores the right
of others. Am I my brother's keeper? Let him guard his own property or
pay the forfeit. But this sentiment would quickly prove a disintegrating
force in the community, able to overthrow a state. It is the ignoble
negative of public spirit; patriotism, all by which nations prosper. And
this early legislation is well devised to check it in detail. If an ox
fall into a pit or cistern, from which I have removed the cover, I must
pay the value of the beast, and take the carcase for what it may be
worth. I ought to have considered the public interest (xxi. 33). If I
let my cattle stray into my neighbour's field or vineyard, there must be
no wrangling about the quality of what he has consumed: I must forfeit
an equal quantity of the best of my own field or vineyard (xxii. 5). If
a fire of my kindling burn his grain, standing or piled, I must make
restitution: I had no right to kindle it where he was brought into
hazard (xxii. 6). This is the same principle which had already
pronounced it murder to let a vicious ox go loose. And it has to do with
graver things than oxen and fires,--with the teachers of principles
rightly called incendiary, the ingenious theorists who let loose
abstract speculations pernicious when put into practice, the
well-behaved questioners of morality, and the law-abiding assailants of
the foundations which uphold law.

It is quite in the same spirit that I am accountable for what I borrow
or hire, and even for its accidental death (since for the time being it
was mine, and so should the loss be); but if I hired the owner with his
beast, it clearly continued to be in his charge (14, 15). But again, my
responsibility may not be pressed too far. If I have not borrowed
property, but consented to keep it for the owner, the risk is fairly
his, and if it be stolen, the presumption is not against my integrity,
although I may be required to clear myself on oath before the judges (7,
8). But I am accountable in such a case for cattle, because it was
certainly understood that I should watch them; and if a wild beast have
torn any, I must prove my courage and vigilance by rescuing the carcase
and producing it (10-13).

But I must not be plunged into litigation without a compensating hazard
on the other side: he whom God shall condemn shall pay double unto his
neighbour (9).

I