an the same thing."

II

The centre of interest lay in the course that might be finally taken by
those who declared that they accepted the principle of the bill, but
demurred upon detail. It was upon the group led from Birmingham that the
issue hung. "There are two principles in the bill," said Mr. Chamberlain
at this time, "which I regard as vital. The first is the principle of
autonomy, to which I am able to give a hearty assent. The second is
involved in the method of giving effect to this autonomy. In the bill the
government have proceeded on the lines of separation or of colonial
independence, whereas, in my humble judgment, they should have adopted the
principle of federation as the only one in accordance with democratic
aspirations and experience."(207) He was even so strong for autonomy, that
he was ready to face all the immense difficulties of federation, whether
on the Canadian or some other pattern, rather than lose autonomy. Yet he
was ready to slay the bill that made autonomy possible. To kill the bill
was to kill autonomy. To say that they would go to the country on the
plan, and not on the principle, was idle. If the election were to go
against the government, that would destroy not only the plan which they
disliked, but the principle of which they declared that they warmly
approved. The new government that would in that case come into existence,
would certainly have nothing to say either to plan or principle.

Two things, said Mr. Chamberlain on the ninth night of the debate, had
become clear during the controversy. One was that the British democracy
had a passionate devotion to the prime minister. The other was the display
of a sentiment out of doors, "the universality and completeness of which,
I dare say, has taken many of us by surprise, in favour of some form of
home rule to Ireland, which will give to the Irish people some greater
control over their own affairs."(208) It did not need so acute a
strategist as Mr. Chamberlain to perceive that the only hope of rallying
any (M121) considerable portion of the left wing of the party to the
dissentient flag, in face of this strong popular sentiment embodied in a
supereminent minister, was to avoid as much as possible all irreconcilable
language against either the minister or the sentiment, even while taking
energetic steps to unhorse the one and to nullify the other.

The prime minister meanwhile fought the battle as a battle for a high
public de