instruction we give, that he does not shift the
centre of gravity as to political and military responsibility for
that country? In brief, if he reports what should be done, he
should not be the judge _who_ should do it, nor ought he to commit
us on that point by advice officially given. It would be extremely
difficult after sending him to reject such advice, and it should
therefore, I think, be made clear that he is not our agent for the
purpose of advising on that point.

On January 18, Lord Hartington (then secretary of state for war), Lord
Granville, Lord Northbrook, and Sir Charles Dilke met at the war office in
Pall Mall. The summons was sudden. Lord Wolseley brought Gordon and left
him in the ante-room. After a conversation with the ministers, he came out
and said to Gordon, "Government are determined to evacuate the Soudan, for
they will not guarantee the future government. Will you go and do it?" "_I
said_, 'Yes.' _He said_, 'Go in.' _I went in and saw them. They said_,
'Did Wolseley tell you our orders?' _I said_, 'Yes.' _I said_, 'You will
not guarantee future government of the Soudan, and you wish me to go up
and evacuate now.' _They said_, 'Yes,' _and it was over, and I left at 8
p.m. for Calais_."(88) This graphic story does not pretend to be a full
version of all that passed, though it puts the essential point
unmistakably enough. Lord Granville seems to have drawn Gordon's (M58)
special attention to the measures to be taken for the security of the
Egyptian garrisons (plural) still holding positions in the Soudan and to
the best mode of evacuating the interior.(89) On the other hand, according
to a very authentic account that I have seen, Gordon on this occasion
stated that the danger at Khartoum was exaggerated, and that he would be
able to bring away the garrisons without difficulty.

Thus in that conclave of sober statesmen a tragedy began. The next day one
of the four ministers met another; "We were proud of ourselves
yesterday--are you sure we did not commit a gigantic folly?" The prime
minister had agreed at once on receiving the news of what was done at the
war office, and telegraphed assent the same night.(90) The whole cabinet
met four days later, Mr. Gladstone among them, and the decision was
approved. There was hardly a choice, for by that time Gordon was at
Brindisi. Gordon, as Mr. Gladstone said, was a hero of heroes. He was a
soldier of infinite personal courage