n the business of feeding the rebel armies, they would
have the protection of both the loyal and Confederate Governments.
The policy of both parties to the struggle was thus subordinated
to the protection of slavery.

But on the 31st of August a new war policy was inaugurated by the
proclamation of General Fremont, giving freedom to the slaves of
rebels in his department. It was greeted by the people of the
Northern States with inexpressible gladness and thanksgiving. The
Republican press everywhere applauded it, and even such Democratic
and conservative papers as the "Boston Post," the "Detroit Free
Press," the "Chicago Times," and the "New York Herald" approved
it. During the ten days of its life all party lines seemed to be
obliterated in the fires of popular enthusiasm which it kindled,
and which was wholly unprecedented in my experience. I was then
on the stump in my own State, and I found the masses everywhere so
wild with joy, that I could scarcely be heard for their shouts.
As often as I mentioned the name of "Fremont," the prolonged hurrahs
of the multitude followed, and the feeling seemed to be universal
that the policy of "a war on peace principles" was abandoned, and
that slavery, the real cause of the war, was no longer to be the
chief obstacle to its prosecution.

But in the midst of this great exultation and joy the President
annulled the proclamation because it went beyond the Confiscation
Act of the 6th of August, and was offensive to the Border States.
It was a terrible disappointment to the Republican masses, who
could not understand why loyal slaveholders in Kentucky should be
offended because the slaves of rebels in Missouri were declared
free. From this revocation of the new war policy, dated the pro-
slavery reaction which at once followed. It balked the popular
enthusiasm which was drawing along with it multitudes of conservative
men. It caused timid and halting men to become cowards outright.
It gave new life to slavery, and encouraged fiercer assaults upon
"abolitionism." It revived and stimulated Democratic sympathy for
treason wherever it had existed, and necessarily prolonged the
conflict and aggravated its sorrows; while it repeated the ineffable
folly of still relying upon a policy of moderation and conciliation
in dealing with men who had defiantly taken their stand outside of
the Constitution and laws, and could only be reached by the power
of war.

When Congress met in Dece