t on the South-west--he moved
upon Dalton, almost simultaneously with Grant's passage of the Rapidan.
And like Grant, he essayed a flank movement; but with far different
result.
There was another point of similarity--the great disparity of numbers.
Sherman could not have had in all, far short of 80,000 men; while
Johnston's greatest exertions could not collect at Dalton an effective
force of 35,000. Many of these, too, were local troops and raw levies,
green and undisciplined; while Sherman's forces were the flower of the
western army.
Such were the points of similarity; but there was one great difference
known to the Confederate leaders and people. Sherman would use every
advantage of strategy and combination, rather than attempt the
sledge-hammer style of attack developed by Grant. And there was more to
be dreaded from his quiet and cautious approach--with its accompanying
care for human life, that would preserve his army--than from any direct
assault, however vigorous. This was proved at the very outset; for his
advance on Dalton was a piece of military tact that--unlike Grant's at
the Wilderness--was founded upon sound calculation. McPherson was
thrown so far round to the South-west as seriously to threaten
Johnston's communications; and by the 8th of June, the latter was
forced to evacuate Dalton and retire down Resaca Valley toward the line
of the Etowah river.
This movement was accomplished with quiet and perfect ease; keeping
ever a steady front to the enemy, pressing rapidly on.
Feeling that the fate of the whole cause was now vested in the little
army left him to defend the great key--Atlanta--Johnston was great
enough to resist the opportunities for glorious battle; to give up,
without a struggle--which could only entail resultless waste of
men--the rich tracts so valuable to us; to offer himself to the
condemnation of unthinking censure--all to insure the safety of that
vital organ of Confederate life.
On the 14th June, the enemy pressed heavily against temporary works in
Resaca Valley and was twice repulsed, with heavy loss. Then Johnston
turned upon him and gained a decisive advantage--driving him two miles.
On the two succeeding days, his attempts amounted to scarcely more than
skirmishes; and on the third our troops resumed, unmolested, their
retreat along the line of the Etowah. By the end of the month Johnston
had taken up a strong position, with his center resting upon Kenesaw
Mountain; wh
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