placed his army in almost
impregnable works around the great prize he was to guard. Foreseeing
the result of his opponent's strategy, he had nullified it by seeking
the position into which he would finally have been forced.

So far, the Virginia and the Georgia campaigns had been markedly
similar in conduct and result. Both armies, driven by overwhelming
numbers, had drawn their lines around their last strongholds; and there
kept their enemy at bay. And had General Johnston been allowed to reap
the reward of his clear foresight and patient abstinence--who can tell
but the festering Lazarus might yet have risen whole, and defied the
vast wealth of aggression hurled against it?

The universal and outspoken disgust of the people at the removal of
Johnston, was in no sense referable to their objection to his
successor. General Hood had forced their highest admiration, and bought
their warmest wishes, with his brilliant courageous and his
freely-offered blood. They knew him to be dauntless, chivalrous and
beloved by his men; and, even if untried in a great command, they were
willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. His first movements,
too--seemingly so brilliant and dashing, compared to the more steady
but resultful ones of Johnston--produced a thrill of pride and hope
with all the people, save the thoughtful few, who felt we could not
afford now to buy glory and victory unless it tended to the one
result--safety.

On the 20th July Hood assumed the offensive. He struck the enemy's
right heavily and with success; repeating the blow upon his extreme
left, on the 22d. The advantage on both days was with the Confederates;
they drove the enemy from his works, captured several thousand
prisoners, and killed and wounded over 3,000 men. But there was no
solid gain in these fights; and, the enemy shifting his line after them
further to the east, there was another furious battle on the 28th day
of July.

In this Hood was less successful, losing heavily and gaining little or
no ground. The results of the fights at Atlanta were briefly these:
Hood had broken the long and sagacious defensive course; the people
were perhaps inspirited at the cost of over 4,000 invaluable men; and
the enemy was taught that we were too weak to drive him from his line,
or even to make any solid impression on him.

Feeling this--and secure in a line of communication with his
base--Sherman sat doggedly and grimly down before Atlanta. He felt he
co