none other. No measure rises in importance above that connected
with the suppression of the rebellion. * * * We stand here for the
people and we act for them. * * * There is no danger to be apprehended
from any secrecy which, in the consideration of war measures, we may
deem it proper to adopt. It is proper for us, as it is for the general
in the field, as it is for your Cabinet ministers, to discuss matters
in secret when they pertain to war.

* * * * *

IN THE HOUSE, _January 22, 1862_.

Mr. THADDEUS STEVENS: * * * Remember that every day's delay costs the
nation $1,500,000 and hundreds of lives. * * * What an awful
responsibility rests upon those in authority; their mistakes may bring
mourning to the land and sorrow to many a fireside. * * * If we cannot
save our honor, save at least the lives and the treasure of the
nation.

* * * * *

About this time Miss Carroll was spoken of by those conversant with
her plans as "the great unrecognized member of Lincoln's Cabinet."
But, glorious as was the success, Miss Carroll's plans were not fully
carried out, to the great after regret of the War Department, who
recognized that the war, which might then have been brought to a
speedy termination, had been greatly prolonged through the omission.

Miss Carroll continued her communications to the War Department,
endeavoring to rectify mistakes.

* * * * *

Extract from Miss Carroll's letter to the Department on the reduction
of Island No. 10, and pointing out the advantages of the immediate
seizure of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, March 26, 1862.

"The failure to take Island No. 10, which thus far occasions much
disappointment to the country, excites no surprise in me. When I
looked at the gunboats at St. Louis and was informed as to their
power, and considered that the current of the Mississippi at full tide
runs at the rate of five miles per hour, which is very near the speed
of our gunboats, I could not resist the conclusion that they were not
well fitted to the taking of batteries on the Mississippi river if
assisted by gunboats perhaps equal to our own. Hence it was that I
wrote Colonel Scott from there that the Tennessee was our strategic
point, and the successes at Fort Henry and Donelson established the
justice of these observations. Had our victorious army, after the fall
of Fo