yer's house; in other words, the price of the goods, whatever it may
be, is intended to be enough to pay the merchant for his cost in
delivering them, and in such cases the contract is not complete until
a delivery has actually taken place.

Again, if the thing purchased is a part of a mass of goods, a
separation must be made to complete the contract. If a man should buy
100 barrels of oil which were a part of 1000 barrels, a separation of
some kind must be made of the particular ones sold. If one should buy
trees in a nursery, to make the contract complete the particular trees
must in some way be known, either by rows or every other tree--in
short, in some way the trees must be clearly set apart. If part of a
mass of timber is bought, the particular logs must be marked or in
some way pointed out from the other part of the mass. This rule
applies to all things bought that form a part of a large mass. The
mode of pointing them out depends on the nature of the thing; a
different kind of separation must be made in some cases from what is
necessary in others.

IX. THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANDISE

The rule of law in buying is, _the buyer must look out for himself_;
and if things are not what he supposed they were he has no rightful
claim against the seller. The maxim of the law is, "_Let the purchaser
beware_"--let him take care of himself. The rule of the Roman law was
different. It was the duty of the seller to tell the buyer of all the
defects known by him in the thing sold, and if he did not he was
responsible for any loss caused by any defect or imperfection found
after purchasing that was known by the seller before.

The modern principle may be looked at from two points of view. First,
_the seller need not make known any defects which the buyer can find
out himself_. Suppose a man is thinking of buying a horse that is
(though he does not know it) blind in one eye. The law says that the
buyer ought to be able to see such a defect quite as readily as the
seller, and if he does not the fault is his own. Blindness in one eye
is quite as easily seen as would be the lack of an ear or tail. And
this principle applies very generally in all purchases. It covers all
visible defects. Nor can any one find much fault with this rule,
because the buyer generally has as good eyesight as the seller, and if
he takes pains, as he should, he is able to discover all ordinary
defects. Furthermore, the buyer doubtless often knows quite a