rt, the only conclusion to be drawn from
all reflection and reasoning upon the subject is, that the British
government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to
apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other
governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

_Dispatch, Oct. 13, 1803._

* * * * *

_Reason for the ambiguity of Treaties._

It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find
in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties
concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war,
and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims
arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring
forward on all occasions.

_Dispatch, Jan. 7, 1804._

_Foundation of British Power in India in 1803._

The British government has been left by the late Mahratta war in a most
glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India,
the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators by treaty of
the disputes of all. The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their
power is settled upon more permanent foundations, than any before known
in India; all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the
institutions and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is
likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of
tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel
the happiness and security which they enjoy.

_Dispatch, Jan. 16, 1804._

* * * * *

_British "Moderation" in India._

I declare that, when I view the treaty of peace,[2] and its
consequences, I am afraid it will be imagined that the moderation of the
British government in India has a strong resemblance to the ambition of
other governments.

[Footnote 2: After the Mahratta war.]

_Jan. 29, 1804._

* * * * *

_Contrast between European and Asiatic Policy._

European governments were, till very lately, guided by certain rules and
systems of policy so accurately defined and generally known, that it was
scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest
and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the corps
diplomatique, in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state.
The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge, a